EURAFRICAN GEOPOLITICS?

A Qualitative Textual Analysis of the French Geopolitical Construction of Africa in the Post-Cold War Period

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Abstract

Françafrique is a neo-colonial practice characterized by frequent armed interventions in Africa that defined France’s Africa-strategy during the Cold War. French leaders have announced a rupture with Françafrique since the early 1990’s. In the meantime, France has increasingly included the EU in its Africa-strategy. The scholarly literature draws diverging conclusions on if France is Europeanizing a neo-colonial strategy or not, and to what extent the Europeanization is linked to the concept of Eurafrica. Eurafrica denotes a (neo-)colonial idea of forming a Euro-African geographical entity and had its heydays in the late 1950’s. There is however no comprehensive definition of the concept and its underlying ideas and assumptions.

This thesis has set out to examine how the concept of Eurafrica can be defined, to what extent French Africa-strategy can be labeled Eurafrican, and if this has evolved in the post-Cold War period, as well as if the announced “rupture” with Françafrique is indeed a change or merely a transfer of a neo-colonial practice to a European level. The thesis concludes that Eurafrica is composed of six subcategories, characterized by constructivist, neo-liberal and neo-realist theoretical assumptions. A frame of analysis is created based on the unpacked definition of Eurafrica and used in a textual analysis of three French White Papers on Defense. It is determined that French Africa-strategy bears less Eurafrican traits than some scholars suggest and is considerably less neocolonial in the 21st century than in 1994.
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1. Introduction

Any story of the world uses implicit geopolitical visions and images; there is no such thing as the geopolitical versus non-geopolitical position in foreign politics.

(Mamadouh & Dijkink, 2006 p. 360)

France was a major colonial power in Africa, rivaled only by Great Britain, from the mid 19th century until the independence of most of its colonies in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s. As it was losing influence over its colonies and colonial claims for self-governance grew, the concept of “Eurafrica” was picked up by French foreign policy makers. The idea was to by pooling European resources and influence, remain in control over France’s African territories. (P. Hansen & Jonsson, 2015a, p. 8). The Eurafrican concept lost its popularity shortly after the independence of France’s African colonies. Instead, a neocolonial practice of frequent military interventions and military presence in Africa, French companies having influence over political decisions in Africa and tight personal networks between the French administration and the government of many African states, was established (Schmidt, 2013; Yates, 2012 pp. 321-322). This was a way to spread grandeur, and France saw keeping Africa as its pré carré or domaine réservé as a way to play the role of a great power during the Cold War-period.

France has repeatedly announced a “rupture” with its neocolonial Africa-strategy, often pejoratively referred to as Françafrique, since the early 1990’s (Charbonneau, 2008, pp. 280-282). Since the end of the Cold War, France has cut a number of links with “unsavory” dictators in its former colonies. France’s market shares in Africa have consistently declined and French army presence in Africa has significantly diminished (Schmidt, 2013, pp. 188-189). Neocolonialism is defined, based on Nkrumha’s (1966, introduction, p. xi) description, as when the sovereignty of an independent state is controlled by economic or military means by another state. Françafrique is defined as French neocolonial practices in Africa.

French military interventions have continued to be frequent in the post-Cold War period, the pattern seems however to have changed as a number of military interventions have been carried out under the European Union (EU) flag since the beginning of the 21st century. (Charbonneau, 2008, pp. 282-283). Scholars (such as Charbonneau, 2008, Koepf, 2012, and Muller, 2014) disagree on if this reshaping is indeed a break with a neocolonial past or merely a refocus from acting as an independent state to maintaining neocolonial relations with Africa through the EU.

Some of the authors (e.g. Charbonneau, 2008) who claim that France is maintaining a neocolonial strategy, repackaged as France influencing the EU or acting with the support of the EU, link this alleged policy to the concept of Eurafrica. Eurafrica is however not a clear cut theory, and according to P. Hansen and Jonsson (2015a, p.8), the use of Eurafrica was, from the 1930’s to its heydays in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s put forward with quite diverse arguments depending on the context.

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1 France performed “over three dozen military interventions in Africa” between the early 1960’s and late 1980’s Schmidt (2013, p.180).
2 “Grandeur” meaning “greatness” or “glory”
3 “Pré-carré” is usually translated as “backyard” or “private preserve”, “domaine réservé”, to “exclusive domain”.
There has been no attempt to clearly unpack the concept of Eurafrica, and define how it is composed and what theoretical assumptions it relies on. Any analysis of France’s current policy by linking it to the historic concept of Euroafricanism is thus risky as the concept has to be better outlined.

The study will analyze French Africa-strategy in the post Cold War era. When defined and used in an analytical framework Eurafrica will give insight to the dynamics of France’s strategy by comparing its geopolitical code in the post-Cold War period to the Euroafrican strategy that was historically discussed in France. This will enable to determine whether, and if so, how and to what extent, the legacy of Euroafricanism has affected French geopolitical construction in the post-Cold War period and how this has changed during this period. By applying a Eurafrican analytical framework, it is possible to establish to what degree French Africa strategy is neo-colonial and if the announced rupture with Françafrique has – as some argue - lead to a French strategy less based on neo-colonialism in the post-Cold War period or if France is merely continuing to pursue a neo-colonial policy through the EU. This thesis will carry out such a study.

1.1. Previous Research

1.1.1. The Euroafrican Construction

The concept of Euroafrica was coined in 1929 by Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi – “the father of the pan-European movement” – and defines an idea - or in the words of Taylor (1990) a geopolitical code, of a united Europe extended to include the African continent (Botz-Bornstein, 2007, pp. 567, 569).

The development of Euroafrica can be separated into four periods. The concept gained support among European intellectuals in the early 1930’s, before losing popularity as relations between European powers deteriorated before the Second World War (see e.g., Botz-Bornstein, 2007; Muller, 2000). It was associated with Fascism and Nazism during the war and did not see much attention in its immediate aftermath (Nordblad, 2014). Euroafrica was picked up again in the 1950’s, with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952 and the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 (P. Hansen & Jonsson, 2015a). The concept has been relatively unnoticed, among scholars (with the exception of, e.g., Martin, 1982) and policy-makers after the decolonization of the majority of EEC states’ colonies. It has however seen renewed attention in academia since the beginning of the 21st century and has been increasingly picked by French political actors during the last 7-10 years. French president Sarkozy (2007), referred to Euroafrica as the “common destiny” of Europe and Africa in a speech in Dakar in 2007 and the French Senate published a report entitled Morocco: Leading Market and Euroafrican Hub in 2017 (Sénat, 2017a).

Some scholars such as Botz-Bornstein (2007) have been interested in how Euroafricanism developed as a geopolitical project in the 1930’s, whereas others, such as Peo Hansen and his colleague Stefan Jonsson (e.g. 2011) and Rik Schreurs (1993), have written on how the Euroafrican idea played a role in motivating the creation of the ECSC and the EEC that preceded the EU. The creation of these institutions was preceded by a Franco-Belgian demand for a European investment fund for colonies of the EEC states, and the association of European territories in Africa (the large majority of them being French) to the EEC was “put forward [by France] as a sine qua non for the ratification of the EEC and Euratom treaties”. Both demands
were accepted by the remaining EEC-states in 1957\(^4\) (Schreurs, 1993). Although Belgium supported much of France’s Eurafrican policy suggestions, *Eurafrica* remains to a large extent a French political project (Schreurs, 1993, pp. 84-85).

The *Eurafrikan* concept is to its fundamental nature geopolitical, this is clearly demonstrated by the near-obsession the advocates of *Eurafricanism* had with maps, geopolitical axes and strategic zones (see, e.g.: P. Hansen & Jonsson, 2015a, pp. 29, 100, 241 ; Muller, 2004, appendix). *Eurafrica* had economic, strategic and idealistic motives. Some *Eurafricanists* had a purely European perspective, whereas others also saw the *Eurafrikan* project as benefitting Africa (P. Hansen & Jonsson, 2015a).

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Martin (1982, p. 226) argues that “[t]he origins of the ideology of Eurafrikan should be kept in mind when the post-colonial era of Africa is being analysed.” Despite Martin’s claim and the apparent renewal of academic attention to Eurafrikan, no author has so far developed a comprehensive analysis of which ideas, arguments and theoretical assumptions the *Eurafrikan* geopolitical construction is composed of, and no systematic analysis on how Eurafrikan relates to today’s French-African relations has been made. The question if Sarkozy’s Eurafrikan is the same as von Coudenhove-Kelergi’s remains unanswered.

### 1.1.2. Divergent Opinions on the Evolution of French Post-Cold War African-Policy

Scholars disagree on to which extent post-Cold War French foreign policy has been neocolonial and how it has evolved over the time-period. Douglas Yates identifies two conflicting perspectives in scholarly literature. The first being the “end of Empire” writing, suggesting that the “French neocolonial Empire is dead”, the second, the “reform as a mere smoke screen” writing, suggests that “the status quo policy of Françafrique is maintained”. Divergent perspectives on how the concept of *Eurafrikan* relates to this schism are exemplified below (Yates 2012 p. 323).

Bourmaud (1996; 2011, pp. 51-54) claims that there are *anciens* and *modernes* within the French administration. The *anciens* want to pursue France’s traditional neocolonial strategy, whereas the *modernes* want to shift from the strategy of Françafrique to pursuing more equal relations with African states. Bourmaud (2011, pp. 53-54) further claims that the more progressive group is dominating but is “unable to be hegemonic” and that French as a result is “devoid of any strategy”. Iverson (2002 pp. 61-62) shares a similar view, but claims that the split is rather between an older, declining Cold-War style mentality, which seeks to maximize French power and influence within its traditional *pre-carré*, and an emerging, European-centered approach. Iverson does not see traits of the *Eurafrikan* intellectual tradition present in

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\(^4\) The other signatories were; The Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Italy.
this emerging European-centered approach: “France is no longer pressuring the EU to maintain a particularistic, Eurafrican-inspired approach to francophone Africa” (Iverson, 2002 pp. 3-4).

Charbonneau (2008, pp. 282-284) notes that armed intervention in Africa has gone from being overwhelmingly a French practice to becoming increasingly under EU flag (though often including a plurality of French soldiers and led by French officers) after the debacles in Rwanda, the Central African Republic (CAR) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the mid-90’s. This use of the EU is according to Charbonneau (2008 p. 284) “more and more perceived as an opportunity” that provides legitimacy for interventions in French interest and that for “political reasons and lack of resources, France [after the failed interventions in the early 90’s] simply cannot act alone any more.” Charbonneau further claims that “European cooperation in Africa has not moved beyond the imperial imaginary. In fact, with Sarkozy, the ‘Europeanisation’ of security policy in Africa has recently taken the form of the old Eurafrica imperial dream.” (Charbonneau, 2008, p. 288).

Charbonneau does however not elaborate on how this link between the historic concept of Eurafrica and today’s Europeanization of French strategy is constructed, neither uses Eurafrica to analyze what Eurafrican characteristics are present in today’s French Africa-strategy. There are different perspectives in the scholarly literature on the existence of a link between today’s Europeanization of French strategy in Africa and the historic concept of Eurafrica. Koepf (2012) makes no reference to Eurafrica in his article on the “Europeanization” of French interventions in Africa and claims that France stopped pursuing Europeanization already in 2009. K. F. Hansen (2009) does discuss Eurafrica in the same context but claims that “we now see a tendency for French Africa policy in praxis turns more and more similar to other states’ Africa policy”.

Europeanization in this discourse refers to either France acting on her own, using EU resources, or encouraging the action of the EU in Africa as this is perceived to be in French interest. The research makes no clear distinction between these two ways of Europeanizing (see e.g., Charbonneau, 2008 and Koepf, 2012). When discussing Europeanization of French interventions, whether linking it to Eurafricanism or not, a realist analysis is usually employed. Realism as a perspective of international relations studies will be returned to. The realist perspective can be exemplified by Charbonneau (2008, p. 280-281) and Koepf (2012, p. 418) who claim that France balances the benefits of Europeanisation against freedom of maneuver, the risk is as Charbonneau (2008, p. 284) puts it, that “[p]riorities and strategies could be set in Brussels instead of Paris”.

To summarize; there are different opinions on what strategy France employs as its influence in Africa is diminishing. Some scholars (such as Charbonneau, 2008 and Muller, 2004) link the Europeanization of French foreign policy towards Africa with the concept or ideology of Eurafricanism whereas others (such as Koepf, 2012) do not make this connection. Eurafricanism is thus seen as a neocolonial practice (often referred to as Françafrique) put to a European level. The issue needs further elaboration and the question of in what ways - if at all – the use of EU in French Africa-strategy relates to the historic concept of Eurafrica, and to what extent it is a Europeanization of neocolonial practice remains unanswered too.
1.2. Purpose and Research Question

The aim of the thesis is threefold. It will examine how Eurafrica as a concept can be defined and analyzed by using three theories of studies on international relations: neo-realism, neo-liberalism and constructivism, thus responding to on what theoretical assumptions the concept is founded. Secondly, it will investigate the role of Eurafrica in French geopolitical construction relating to Africa, and how this has evolved since the end of the Cold War in 1991. Thirdly, by answering to the first two questions, the thesis will be able to shed light on whether the “rupture” with France’s colonial and neo-colonial past that has been announced since the early 1990’s and perhaps most vividly proposed under the presidency of Sarkozy (2007 – 2012) (Charbonneau, 2008, pp. 280-282 ), is indeed a change or merely a transfer of a neocolonial strategy to a European level, thereby echoing the Eurafrican thoughts of the 1950’s.

The reason for studying the post-Cold War period is that the opinions within academia diverge on to which degree, and how, Eurafricanism has been influencing French geopolitical construction since the end of the Cold War. France is, according to Checkel (1997, pp. 475, 477-478 ) illustrative of statist domestic empowerment of international norms. By this Checkel suggests that “élite learning” is primary to “societal pressure on élites” in the construction of the norms of behavior of leaders. The thesis focuses on the geopolitical construction of state policy, what Tuathail (1999, pp. 110-111), refers to as practical geopolitics; i.e., “how common geographical understandings and perceptions enframe foreign policy conceptualization and decision making” of policy makers.

The research questions are thus:

1. What are the components of the concept of Eurafrica?

2. How has the French Africa-strategy related to the Eurafrican geopolitical construction in the post-Cold War period?

The thesis will be of relevance within the academic field by contributing to research on Eurafrica by investigating to which degree French pressure for the inclusion of the EU in its African relations is the end of Françafrique or a Europeanization of French neocolonialist tradition. It will do so by investigating how Africa is portrayed in French geopolitical strategy and how this has evolved over time. It will add to research on the concept of Eurafrica by analyzing how and to what extent Eurafricanism has been present in France’s geopolitical construction in the post-Cold War period. It will further contribute to the academic fields of international relations and political geography by unpacking Eurafrica and providing a comprehensive definition of the concept based on international relations theories, something that has never been done before. The thesis will be of extra-disciplinary relevance by investigating the credibility of French reshaping of African relations. It will also be of relevance by investigating to what extent a (neo-)colonial strategy is present in French policy documents, and to what extent it has evolved since the Cold War. It will clarify the development in French geopolitical code since the end of the Cold War and thereby clarifying in what light France’s policy and practices in Africa should be seen today. It will also be of relevance by clarifying how France – one of the EU’s most important member states - perceives the EU in its geopolitical construction and add information on how (dominance over) Africa relates to French national identity construction.
2. Theory

2.1. Point of Departure of the Thesis: Critical Geopolitical Approach to Eurafricanism

The thesis will use a critical perspective on geopolitics, and in line with scholars such as Dijink (1996) and Tuathail (1992, 1999), analyze French geopolitical construction in relation to Africa as identity-based, cultural and historic, and claim that the supposed objective logic in how France places Africa in its geopolitical construction is indeed a construct.

Geopolitics has traditionally been understood as the assessment of geographic conditions “underlying either power (security) of a particular state or the balance of power in the global configuration of continents and oceans.” The interpretation of the World is affected by identity and the “idea of the territorial self and its relationship with other territorial entities” (Dijink, 1996 pp. 3, 6-7). Geopolitics is a concept that is generally portrayed as having two main components; one geostrategic security or military component and one economic component (privileged trade relations, access to natural resources). In the majority of accounts of geopolitical theory these are used in parallel without making any clear distinction between the two (see e.g., Parker, 1998). Other authors make a clear distinction. David Harvey (2003) and Giovanni Arrighi (2005a, 2005b) claim that the two components are intertwined.

Mamadouh and Dijkink (2006) introduce critical geopolitics as:

[Scholars of critical geopolitics are] interested in how different structures of geopolitical thinking and seeing are useful for politicians or movements that need to mobilise support. According to the advocates of a critical approach we should deconstruct geopolitical images or narratives by showing that they are extensions of (domestic) policy aims of particular states or politicians or that they reproduce historic structures of power that have become obsolete (the state).

(Mamadouh & Dijkink 2006 p. 361)

The purpose of the study is to unpack Eurafrica, a geopolitical concept, to investigate to which extent post-Cold War French Africa-policy has been Eurafrican, and how French geopolitical strategy towards Africa in the post-Cold War period has been of neocolonial nature. The geopolitical nature of the purpose makes critical geopolitics approach suitable to form the foundation of this thesis.

2.2. Three Theories of International Relations

Neo-realism and neo-liberalism are, according to Powell (1994, p. ?), “[t]wo of the most influential contemporary approaches to international relations theory”. Since France’s relation to Africa is deeply rooted in French identity and “[e]ver since the French Third Republic, from 1870 to 1914, an idea of a ‘greater France’ has been an essential component of national identity” (Yates, 2012 p. 324), also the constructivist perspective is useful for studying French-African relations. These perspectives are used to analyze contemporary French geopolitical strategy concerning Africa and determine the theoretical assumption on which the Eurafrican concept relies. A brief overview of their main characteristics will be outlined below.
2.1.1. Neo-realism

Realist scholars claim that the “primary obligations’ of any government ‘is to the interests of the national society it represents’” and that moral values are irrelevant in policy-making” (Kennan, 1954, quoted in: Donnelly, 2013, p. 51). Realism claims that states are “conscious of their position within the hierarchy of states, and at a minimum seek to maintain that position, at a maximum to increase it to the point of domination”. According to the neo-realist perspective on international relations, states are concerned with survival in an anarchic environment. They are subject to the nature of the international system and act rationally according to their position in the world according to its anarchic construction. This means that states are ultimately concerned with their survival, that they seek to maximize their security (Byrne, p.12). Neo-realism sees alliances as being “about capability aggregation” and see them as formed “to counter-balance powerful states […] or threatening adversaries” and thus responses to security needs (Byrne, 2013 p. 12).

2.1.2. Neo-liberalism

The liberal perspectives on international relations claim that the type of government and its values affect how the state will act on the international stage. Neo-liberalism sees interdependence between states as the root to peace and that mutual advantages can be gained through cooperation (Burchill, 2013 pp. 11-14). Neo-liberalism sees institutions as a response to threats that are more multi-facetted than those perceived in realism and liberals are concerned with the functioning and legitimacy of such institutions (Byrne, 2013 pp. 12-13).

2.1.3. Constructivism

Reus-Smith claims that, “In spite of [their] differences, neo-realism and neo-liberalism are both rationalist theories”. Thus, neo-realism and neo-liberalism assume that all actors’ interests are “exogenous to social interaction” and society is assumed to be a “strategic realm where individuals or states come together to pursue their predefined interest”. They see actors as rational, forming social relations to maximize their interest “within the environmental constraints they encounter.” (Reus-Smit, 2013, p. 220)

The constructivist approach to international relations is a response to this rationalist logic of neo-realism and neo-liberalism and “is characterized by an emphasis on the importance of normative as well as material structures, on the role of identity in shaping political action and on the mutually constitutive relationship between agents and structures” Reus-Smit (2013, p. 217). In contrast with neo-realism and neo-liberalism, it claims that beliefs, ideas and values are just as important as “material structures” when actors establish interests and make decisions (Reus-Smit, 2013, pp. 220, 224).

3. Method and Material

The thesis is composed of two parts that are reflected by the method. First, Eurafrica will be unpacked into subcategories, this will provide a definition of the concept. The unpacked definition will then be applied in an analytical framework to analyze French Africa-policy in the post-Cold War period.
3.1. Unpacking the concept of *Eurafrica* and Creating an Analytical Framework

The thesis will unpack the concept of *Eurafrica* and will thereby create a definition of the concept by determining which components it is constituted of. From this definition, an analytical framework of Eurafricanism is developed. This tool is used to, by qualitative textual analysis, investigate the influence of *Eurafrica* in France’s geopolitical construction in relation to Africa since the end of the Cold War. It will further enable to determine to what extent there are traits of neo-colonialism in this construction.

The unpacked definition of Eurafricanism is developed from Hansen and Jonsson’s (2015a) *Eurafrica: The Untold History of European Integration and Colonialism*. By careful reading, a systemized set of subcategories of Eurafricanism are established. The subcategories will be further developed by grounding them in the wider scholarly discourse on the concept of *Eurafrica*.

The definition of Eurafricanism is rooted in the discussion on *Eurafrica* in the 1950’s for two reasons. It is the only period where a serious discussion about the *Eurafrican* project has taken place on a high political level. Furthermore, the Eurafrican rhetoric from this period was – as opposed to earlier *Eurafricanism* centered in Central Europe – largely a Franco-Belgian phenomenon (Schreurs, 1993, p.84). It will be argued that for these reasons, French policymakers that prepared the documents that form units of analysis in this thesis are more likely to have been influenced by Eurafrican rhetoric from this period.

In order to give structure to the analysis when performing a qualitative textual analysis, a tool for analysis has to be created (Esaiasson, Gilljam, Oscarsson, Towns, & Wångnerud, 2017). An analytical tool will be developed from the unpacked definition of *Eurafricanism* by applying the three perspectives on international relations theory described above to subcategories, as well as the nature of France’s action in the envisaged strategy (independent, with support of the EU or through the EU), the analytical tool is developed.

3.2. Qualitative Textual Analysis

The thesis investigates, by qualitative textual analysis, how the French geopolitical code is constructed in relation to Eurafrica. It will critically investigate French policy documents and deconstruct the underlying assumptions. Qualitative textual analysis is a suitable method when the central parts of a text is not quantifiable, when searching for a *meaning* in the documents studied, or when the content that is searched for is “hidden in the text” and only accessible through intensive reading. It is essential to read the texts actively and critically “ask questions” to the text. (Esaiasson et al., 2017, p. 211). The thesis focuses on documents relating to French geopolitical strategy. The texts studied are read repeatedly in order to determine the prevalence of different strategies in France’s geopolitical construction. Using the analytical tool, that is developed as described, above enables to mark to what degree different strategies that can be labeled as *Eurafrican* are present in the French overarching geopolitical construction and to what extent the rupture with France’s neo-colonial past can be noticed in French strategy. The analytical tool is applied in line with the perspective of critical geopolitics in order to determine the role of *Eurafrican* French geopolitical construction relating to Africa, and how this has evolved since the end of the Cold War in 1991 and, if the “rupture” with France’s colonial and
neo-colonial past is indeed a change or merely a transfer of neo-colonial strategy to a European level, thereby echoing the Eurafrican thoughts of the 1950’s.

A distinction between **Present** and **Dominant** traits is made in order to refine the analysis. **Dominant** traits are traits that are specifically emphasized, whereas **Present** traits are mentioned but with less emphasis and not as frequently. The traits will be included in the frame of analysis described above in order to determine the presence and nature of the subcategories of Eurafricanism in French strategy. In order to increase **intersubjectivity** and limit the risk of prejudice affecting the analysis, the texts are read in a structured manner and passages are categorized in the subcategories. It is important that passages are not only picked if they confirm the existence of the subcategory, but also if they contradict its existence. Due to the length of the White Papers, the most important passages will have to be singled out to represent the main conclusions that can be drawn in each sub-category.

### 3.3. Choosing Material

Three French strategy documents are selected for studying; the French White Papers on Defense and National Security, published in 1994, 2008 and 2013 (Ministère de la Défense, 1994, 2008, 2013b). The White Papers cover the post-Cold war period in a satisfactory way and will thus allow an analysis of the evolution of French geopolitical construction during this period. The documents are chosen in order to give information on the geostrategic-security component and the economic component of geopolitics referred to by Harvey (2003) and Arrighi (2005a, 2005b) and described above. They have the advantage of comprehensively lining out French strategy and thus provide for an in-depth analysis of French geopolitical construction.

The White Papers do not constitute decisions on French strategy. They are the foundations for politicians when making decisions on foreign policy. “The publication of the White Paper is”, according to the French Ministry of Defense, “an important moment [for France]” as they “lay out the principal strategic orientations of the French defense for the coming years” (Ministère de la Défense, 2013b).

The White Paper of 2013 was, for example, referred to in 17 separate legislative documents in the French Senate only in 2016 (Sénat, 2017b). According to the French think tank Accès Défense (2016), the most recent White Paper “lays out the major orientations of French defense and security strategy in the 15 years to come” and therefore reflects the geopolitical construction of France today. The White Papers do not treat Africa specifically, available official documents that treat French Africa strategy are however scarce and do not cover the whole time-period.

### 3.4. Validity and Reliability

Esaiasson and his colleagues (2017, p.58, 64), differentiate between **concept validity** (i.e. the “absence of systematical errors”) and **reliability** (i.e. the absence random errors”). High **concept validity** and **reliability** gives a good **result validity** (i.e. “that we measure what we claim to measure”). They further argue that **concept validity** is dependent on the correspondence between the theoretical definition and the operational indicator

The frame of analysis (the operational indicator) is based on, and closely connected to the concept of **Eurafrica** as unpacked above. Provided that **Eurafrica** is correctly unpacked, thereby corresponding to the **Eurafrica** that was discussed in the 1950’s, the thesis can be said to have
a good concept validity. The unpacking of Eurafirca is based on careful and structured study of Hansen and Jonsson’s (2015) Eurafrica: The Untold History of European Integration and Colonialism, a work of reference in the field. The risk for insufficient concept validity is therefore deemed to be small concerning the concept of Eurafrica. The concept of neo-colonialism is based on a discussion provided by Kwamé Nkrumah (1965), the inventor of the term. Neo-colonialism is in Nkrumah’s definition a practice of acts through which a state by superior military and economic power is controlling another state. The theoretical tool has been developed in order to analyze the envisaged neo-colonial practice and the assumptions behind rather than if France has a neo-colonial imagination, for which a discursive analysis would perhaps been better suited.

The risk of insufficient accuracy in the textual analysis is more important. Bergström and Boreus (2012, p. 133) claim that there are problems linked to reaching intersubjectivity in all forms of textual analysis. The systematic approach and the level of detail in the analytical framework should however minimize this problem. The White Papers on Defense are the prime documents of French strategy, this means that they, correctly analyzed, can be judged to reflect how French strategy is constructed within the French state. The risk that more sensitive parts of French strategy are expressed in more covert strategies has to be taken into account. The existence of such documents would however not invalidate the results of the analysis as the White Papers are, as explained above, important foundations for decisions and law making relating to French geopolitical strategy.

Therefore, the concept validity and reliability remains high and the result validity is overall satisfying.

4. Results and Analysis

Below follow the results of the study. The concept of Eurafrica is unpacked and defined, and an analytical framework is developed and used to by textual analysis study how French Africa-policy relates to the concept of Eurafrica that was historically discussed and how this has changed over time, and to whether the rupture with French neo-colonial practice in Africa is shown in France’s geopolitical construction.

4.1. Defining Eurafrica

Based on careful reading of Hansen and Jonsson’s (2015a) Eurafrica: The Untold History of European Integration and Colonialism, the concept of Eurafrica can be unpacked into a systemized set of subcategories as follows. The subcategories will further be developed by grounding them in the wider scholarly discourse on Eurafrica.

A. A Vision of (Neo-)colonial Domination of Africa.

“The Eurafircan idea” is, according to Dramé and Saul (2004, p. 2), “[a] carrier of conservatism and contributes to endorsing an unconfessed neocolonialism”. Although Eurafirca was, according to P. Hansen and Jonsson (2015b, p. 68), derived from an idea of a hierarchy of civilizations and was built on the idea that Africans would not politically represent Africa, there are few references to any civilizing mission, when speaking of Eurafircanism that is otherwise common when discussing France’s colonial project. Dominance over Africa was an
imperialistic project that would give raw material, energy and status. (see, e.g., P. Hansen & Jonsson, 2012).

The (neo-)colonialism envisaged by the leading Eurafricanists should be seen rather as a project of realpolitik, put forward with a realist logic.

**B. Influence over Africa as a Source of Status as in the World.**

The idea was that in order to be a powerful international actor, France needed Africa to stay under strong European influence (See, e.g.: Hansen & Jonsson, 2013). The demands for independence of colonial territories, and the emergence of the two superpowers, made French (and European) leaders see *Eurafrica* as way for France to maintain her place in the world by guaranteeing that “the indispensable economic base of France as a great power would be to be assured in the future” (Schreurs, 1993, p. 86; see also Dramé & Saul, 2004, p. 1). The influence over Africa and thus in the World that the creation of Eurafrica would give was seen as the “revenge” after the loss of French prestige caused by the failures in Indochina and Suez (P. Hansen & Jonsson, 2013).

This argument is alternating between realist and constructivist logics. By having influence over Africa, either by itself or through the integration of Europe, France has resources and power on the international stage. However, as the references to the Eurafrican construction providing a “revenge” for France exemplifies, influence over Africa is also essential for France’s identity as a great power.

**C. Africa as a Way of Balancing Against Other Actors in the Global Political System.**

One of the major ideas behind the *Eurafrican* project was to by uniting Europe and Africa balancing the (hard and soft) power of the USA and the Soviet Union. The weakness of Europe in relation to the USA and the Soviet threat of invasion was seen as an argument for forming an entity to counterbalance the two major world powers (see, e.g.: Dramé and Saul, 2004, p.3).

This argument has traits of a realist and constructivist logic. The literature has two themes, the first one being that by uniting Europe and controlling Africa, France would have access to the same resources as the two superpowers and as such get the resources of a third superpower. There is also a constructivist side to this argument; by controlling Africa, Europe *is* a great power on equal terms with the Soviet Union and the USA.

**D. Africa as a Strategic Interest.**

Sidaway and Power (2005) argue that *Eurafrica* offered the West both the area for defense in depth and access to vital resources such as uranium, and petroleum and European strategic independence vis-à-vis the USA and the Soviet Union. However, Eurafrica was not a solution to security problems in Africa and the coordination of European armed forces was never envisaged even when France was fighting (and losing) bloody and costly wars of independence (P. Hansen & Jonsson, 2015a, pp. 117-137)

This is a neo-realist argument. By having control over Africa, France ensures its security and ultimately its survival.
E. Africa as an Economic Interest.

The *Eurafrican* vision sees Africa as an important economic asset for Europe. Africa’s resources are not primarily seen as important for French military strategy but economically valid. The idea is that Europe needs to pool resources in order to obtain the fiscal power needed to effectively invest in African states, that Africa is too large to be handled by only one European state (Avit, 2005, p. 21). Schreurs (1993) argues that “it is not a little surprising that France, the second colonial power in terms of area, decided to lift the barriers of its colonial market and progressively renounce the privileged economic position”.

That Europe must unite to pool resources in order to exploit African resources follows a neo-realist logic.

F. A vision of a unity with Africa a based on “geographic complementarity” and as an “outgrowth of neo-classical development policy”.

The Eurafrican vision was based on idea of a Euro-African unity, by creating “not only a geographic entity, but a politic and economic entity”. This argument is to a large extent based on the theory of “geographic complementarity” to justify the fusion between Europe and Africa, thereby creating a zone where “every hour, every minute, from north to south, there is somewhere a man that sows and one that harvests which makes a continued yearly production possible” (Dramé & Saul, 2004, p. 97). Contrary to the previous subcategory, this argument sees *Eurafrica* as beneficial also for Africa. The European states should engage in an “enhancement of Africa”, which would lead to an elevation of the standard of living in Africa as well as in Europe (Avit, 2005, p. 17).

Guy Martin sees this aspect of Eurafrican ideology as “an outgrowth of neo-classical development policy” meaning that “the goods that a nation should export and import ought to be decided according to its own specific factor endowment”. Africa was to produce and export agricultural and mineral raw materials, as well as labor-intensive, standardized manufactured goods, while the developed economies should continue to produce the most sophisticated goods from their heavy, technologically advanced industries. (Martin, 1982 pp. 231-233).

While the literature on *Eurafricanism* is practically devoid of references to spreading liberal values and norms, the focus on interdependence and mutual gains through cooperation makes for concluding that this is a neo-liberal argument.

G. Africa as a way for France to promote European integration.

P. Hansen and Jonsson (2015a, p. 8) claim that “[a]ccording to the Eurafrican idea, European integration would come about only through a coordinated exploitation of Africa”. Robert Schuman, at the time of being the Prime Minister of France, went as far as to suggest that France should give Africa as a “dowry” to the united Europe (P. Hansen & Jonsson, 2011).

Giving European powers a share of the richness of Africa and thereby encouraging European states to unite fits into the liberal tradition of studies on international relations.
4.2. Creating an Analytical Framework

The unpacked definition of Eurafrica will be used in a frame of analysis to study French policy in the post-Cold War era. The sub-categories of Eurafrica and the theories of IR (neo-realism, neo-liberalism and constructivism) that go with them, will be marked on the vertical axis. The frame of analysis will depart from the fact that the Eurafrican ideology is based on the inclusion of the EU (previously the EEC) in the actions of France, either as supporting French actions by providing support or as France supporting the EU in acting in the interest of France. The nature of France’s actions (through/with the EU or unilaterally) will therefore be marked on the horizontal axis.

Table 1: The Analytical Framework of French Africa-Strategy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics of geopolitical construction</th>
<th>France acting by itself</th>
<th>France acting with the support of the EU</th>
<th>France acting through influencing the EU</th>
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<td>Subcategory of Eurafrica</td>
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<tr>
<td>A. A (neo-)colonial vision of domination of Africa</td>
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<td>B. Influence over Africa as a source of French status in the World</td>
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<td>C. Africa as a Way of Balancing Against Other Actors in the Global Political System.</td>
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<td>D. Africa as a strategic interest</td>
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<td>E. Africa as an Economic interest</td>
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<td>F. The vision of a unity based on “geographic complementarity” and as an “outgrowth of neo-classical development policy”</td>
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<tr>
<td>G. Africa as a way for France to promote European integration.</td>
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</table>
4.3. Analysis of France’s Africa-Policy in the post-Cold War Period

The subcategories of *EuroAfrica* form the basis of the structure of analysis. The three White Papers on Defense are read repeatedly, each time focusing on a specific subcategory. The character of France’s envisaged strategy (if France is pictured to act by itself, with the support of the EU, or through supporting the EU’s involvement in Africa) and the frequency in its occurrence (present or dominant) is determined. A summary of the results will then be given.

A. A vision of (neo-)colonial domination of Africa?

There are no signs of open neo-colonialism in France’s Africa-strategy in any of the White Papers. However, the agency of Africans gained increased attention over the period studied. The paper of 1994 does not refer to the will of African states, whereas the paper of 2008 sees a need for restructuring of relations and that there should be a “progressive conversion” of French-African security relations to “contribute to an increase in power of the means of collective and regional security of Africans” (*Ministère de la Défense*, 2008, p.72). The paper of 2013 claims that all military interventions rely on the support of the local population and “[i]n order to obtain the support essential to their success, they must respond to the expectations of the populations concerned” (*Ministère de la Défense*, 2013, p.24).

The conclusion that there are signs of implicit strategies of neocolonial domination in the White Paper of 1994 can be drawn. This analysis is further strengthened by citing the very final sentence: “It’s the ambition of this White Paper on Defense, that wants to bear the mark and the imprint of France, of its radiance and its memory, of its heritage and its history.” (*Ministère de la Défense*, 1994, p. 160). There is however no sign of inclusion of the EU into this neo-colonial geopolitical imagination. Contrasting the envisaged neo-colonial status quo in the White Paper of 1994, the White Papers of 2008 and 2013 expressively state a wish to break with France’s neo-colonial past.

*Table 2: A vision of (neo-)colonial domination of Africa?*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics of geopolitical construction</th>
<th>France acting by itself</th>
<th>France acting with the support of the EU</th>
<th>France acting through the EU</th>
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<td>2008: Absent</td>
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My translation of “rayonnement”
B. Influence over Africa as a source of French status in the World?

In the White Paper of 1994, there are repeated references to France’s “rank in the world” and its “power”, and the global interests and responsibilities that are claimed to follow from this status, (Ministère de la Défense, 1994, pp. 23, 25-26, 50). “The presence of French overseas territories, the influence that we exercise in Africa […] forbids us to limit our strategy to a purely continental dimension” (Ministère de la Défense, 1994, preface). There is only one reference to French status in the World in the White Paper of 2008, French military capacities and economic power, and not influence over Africa, are seen as the source of this power (Ministère de la Défense, 2008, p. 311). The White Paper of 2013 states that: “France is present in every ocean and in most continents”, that it “maintains a global presence on the international stage” and that its influence “can be seen in the widespread use of its language”. (Ministère de la Défense, 2013, pp. 13-15).

The White Paper of 1994 claims that the rank of France in the world will “to a large part linked to its aptitude to influence the European construction and the coming evolutions […]. So that […] she can speak with a firm voice everywhere”. The paper also argues that France should support that the EU assumes increased responsibility in Africa (Ministère de la Défense, 1994, p. 26). No expressive differentiation is made between independent French action, multilateral action under French leadership, or action under the command of another state, when it comes to France’s status in the World in the White Paper of 1994. The White Paper does however more often reference to French status when speaking of unilateral action than multilateral (Ministère de la Défense, 1994, p. 25, 50).

It will thus be argued that influence over Africa is envisaged as a source of French status and prestige in the paper of 1994, when France acts unilaterally is dominantly occurring. References to French status when acting with support of, or by influencing, the EU are present. References to France’s status in the World in relation to Africa are absent in 2008, and although a plurality of French speakers in the World live in Africa, the statements in the Paper of 2013 do not qualify as seeing Africa as a “source of French status in the World”.

Table 3: Influence over Africa as a source of French status in the World?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics of geopolitical construction</th>
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6 The contemporary French overseas territories are located in the Caribbean, on the South American continent and in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.
C. Africa as a Way of Balancing Against Other Actors in the Global Political System?

The White Paper of 1994 states that the power of Germany is predestined to increase after its reunification. However, France wishes to increase cooperation with Germany and it is suggested that France supports an increase of Germany’s international engagements (Ministère de la Défense, 1994, pp. 9, 32). The Paper of 2008 argues the importance for the EU to “make up for” the “weakness in capacity of intervention at distance” and suggests that France should support giving the EU more resources for rapid action, and suggests that the EU’s “crisis management” interventions should be led from Brussels. (Ministère de la Défense, 2008, pp. 89-90, 2013a, pp. 95-96). There are recurring statements that the EU should have more influence in NATO. The Paper of 1994 expresses a wish for greater autonomy of Europe, which should be guaranteed by a “common European defense”, as a complement to the security that is given by France’s NATO membership. The White Paper of 2008 claims that NATO does not “have monopoly on peace-keeping operations” but wants France to take a leading role in promoting a more direct and effective cooperation with the USA and NATO (Ministère de la Défense, 2008, pp. 23, 68). The White Paper of 2013 sees the EU increasingly assuming its “responsibilities” in Africa as necessary since the USA and Canada “consider themselves to be less directly concerned” than the EU in Africa and the Mediterranean (Ministère de la Défense, 2013a, p. 55).

The White Paper of 1994 claims that France should promote increased partnership with Russia, but does not speak of any state’s action in Africa (Ministère de la Défense, 1994, p. 31). The White Paper of 2008 claims that the Chinese and Russian “penetration” of Africa is accompanied by arms sales and that Indian and Chinese pursuit for raw material may lead to tension and conflict but suggests that France sees the states as partners, provided that they address strategic issues in Africa and other regions in a similar way that France does. (Ministère de la Défense, 2008, pp. 23, 25, 45, 47, 68). It is however not stated that France should balance against the influence of these states. The Paper of 2013 also notes, but does not problematize, the influence that other actors have in Africa (Ministère de la Défense, 2013a, p. 39).

The White Papers do not express a wish to balance against other EU states, the USA or NATO, but rather to increase cooperation. This subcategory can be marked as absent in 1994. The White Paper of 2008 gives an ambiguous picture of increased influence of China and other states. The influence is seen as problematic. Cooperation is nevertheless encouraged. There is no strategy to stop the influence of other states in Africa or to use Africa as a tool to balance against other actors. There are thus clear signs of an end to the type of thinking where Africa is seen as a French ‘domaine réservé’. The argument can thus be marked as absent in all fields of Table 4.
### Table 4: Africa as a Way of Balancing Against Other Actors in the Global Political System?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcategory of Euroafrica</th>
<th>Characteristics of geopolitical construction</th>
<th>France acting by itself</th>
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<td>2008: Absent</td>
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### D. Africa as a Strategic Interest?

Whereas the White Paper of 1994 notes Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East as the only zones “of strategic interest” to France (Ministère de la Défense, 1994, p.25). The papers of 2008 and 2013 see Africa, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean and the Antilles as regions of strategic priority. The White Paper of 2008 gives attention to a “critical zone” denoted as the “Arch of Crisis”, compromising North Africa and the Sahel, and stretching to the Persian Gulf (Ministère de la Défense, 2008, pp. 43-51).

The White Paper of 1994 focuses on security in Africa as a military issue (Ministère de la Défense, 2008, p.43). The White Paper of 2008 suggests a more complex solution. Insecurity in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is to be combatted through development aid (as its poverty is perceived as a security risk for France and the EU), the strengthening of African security forces, and military intervention (Ministère de la Défense, 2008, p.?). The White Paper of 2013 largely repeats the solutions of 2008 but also wishes to establish “a collective security architecture in Africa” which is seen as a “priority of France’s cooperation and development policy.” (Ministère de la Défense 2013, pp. 53-54). Supporting fragile and failed states are at the center of this policy, and French intervention for “crisis control” in fragile or failed states is explicitly put forward as a possibility (Ministère de la Défense, 2013a, pp. 33, 39, 55, 85). The paper of 1994 wishes to coordinate French actions with the EU. Those of 2008 and 2013 urges that France increasingly develops its capacities to play a leading role (Ministère de la Défense, 2008, p. 206; 2013, p.11) and that the EU (by itself) plays a more assertive role in Africa, claiming that security in Africa is of priority interest for all EU states. These objectives are not seen as conflicting (Ministère de la Défense, 1994, p. 41; 2008, p. 154; 2013, p. 55).

This means that Africa is perceived more as a security problem, rather than an asset which would be the case if the French strategy was true to the security argument of the Euroafrican concept. While not being present in the Paper of 1994, the Euroafrican vision of Africa as a security asset is appearing in the White Papers of 2008 and 2013, that - while still focusing on security problems in Africa – also portray Africa as a base for intervention in other regions. The existence of critical zones, according to the paper of 2008, “implies a sufficient [military] presence in the Mediterranean, in the Western parts of the African continent and in the West Indies.” Where possible, action with Europe and NATO is preferred to unilateral action (Ministère de la Défense, 2008, p. 72).
All three White Papers make a division between operations in defense of French vital interests and peacekeeping operations (in Africa and elsewhere). It is stated that where French vital interests are threatened, France should try to coordinate with allies and partners, but must be prepared to act alone. (Ministère de la Défense, 1994, pp. 24-25; 2008, p.311; 2013, p.84). In 1994, France envisages to perform peacebuilding missions alone or in a UN framework. In 2008 and 2013 however, France expects to act in a multilateral framework at practically all peacebuilding missions (Ministère de la Défense, 1994, pp. 60-61; 2008 pp. 72-73; 2013, p.78).

There are no references to strategic economic resources in any of the White Papers, but since Africa is visualized as a base for action in other regions in the papers of 2008 and 2013, the subcategory will be marked as present both as French independent action (with or without the support of the EU) and as France promoting the EU’s action in these papers.

**Table 5: Africa as a Strategic Interest?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcategory of Eurafrica</th>
<th>France acting by itself</th>
<th>France acting with the support of the EU</th>
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<td>2013: Present</td>
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**E. Africa as an Economic Interest?**

The White Paper of 1994 has an ambiguous vision of Africa as an economic interest. It states that France’s engagement in Africa, “corresponds more to an assessment of the international responsibilities in a zone where it can exert its influence than preoccupations of strategic nature.” The same paper argues however that: “it seems that the large objectives evolve little. France has to be able to […] defend its interest in the world.” “Interests” are later defined as “territory, economic wealth, means of communication, presence of nationals” (Ministère de la Défense, 1994, pp. 23-24). The economic incentives for focusing on Africa are however more clearly noted in the paper of 2008:

> The abundance of strategic raw materials and energy resources calls for a valorization, firstly to benefit Africans themselves. (...) They can [also] contribute to favoring the European technologies. A European strategy, in partnership with the countries concerned, for an equitable access to these resources, has thus to be implemented (Ministère de la Défense, 2008, p. 45).

The White Paper of 2013 notes that “If the next few decades confirm the economic take-off in sub-Saharan Africa […], the continent may become an engine of global growth and make a strong contribution to European prosperity” (Ministère de la Défense, 2013a, p. 39).

The economic interests in Africa are dominant and seen as European rather than French in the papers of 2008 and 2013, whereas they are less noted, and seen only as French in 1994.
F. A vision of a unity based on “geographic complementarity” and as an “outgrowth of neo-classical development policy”?

The idea that Europe and Africa share interests is present in all White Papers, but gets increased attention in those of 2008 and 2013, as well as Africa’s economic and strategic possibilities for Europe. They are however never suggesting that Africa and Europe form a “sphere” or “zone”. There are most references to Europe and Africa as an interdependent unit in the White Paper of 2013, which gives most attention to the mutual interests of Europe and North Africa. (Ministère de la Défense, 2013a, p. 32). The imagined unity is however far from as central as it was in the Eurafrican discussion in the 1950’s. The difference from the Eurafricanism of the 1950’s can clearly be exemplified by the geopolitical axes constructed in one of the most important Eurafrican publications, Edmond Combeaux’s (1957) Nécessité d’une Eurafrique that portrays Eurafrique as a “strategic system”, and one of three entities that divide the World.

Despite the lack of centrality, the subcategory will be marked as present in 2013, but only when France acts through the EU. It will be marked as absent everywhere else.

Table 7: A vision of a unity based on “geographic complementarity” and as an “outgrowth of neo-classical development policy”?
G. Africa as a way for France to promote European Integration?

Whereas all the papers repeatedly refer (with increased pertinence over time) to the importance of the EU for France’s security, and suggest that France should take a leading role in strengthening EU-security cooperation, none of them brings up France’s influence in Africa as a tool to promote European integration. (Ministère de la Défense, 1994, pp. e.g., 23-27, 155; 2008, pp. e.g., 83-84, 110-111; 2013, pp. e.g., 30-33, 56-65).

French influence in Africa as a tool to promote European integration is marked as absent in all fields of Table 8.

Table 8: Africa as a way for France to promote for European Integration?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics of geopolitical construction</th>
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<td>Subcategory of Euroafrica</td>
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Summary of Analysis

Africa gets increased attention over the period of study, from an economic as well as a security perspective. French strategy changes from bearing neo-colonial traits in 1994 to urging for a rupture with neo-colonialism in 2008 and 2013. All papers show signs of neo-liberalism and neo-realism in their vision of French geopolitical strategy. A constructivist argument of influence in Africa as a source of French status in the World is Dominant in the White Paper of 1994, whereas it is largely absent in 2008 and 2013. In all White Papers, the strategy of Europeanization of security, diplomatic and economic relations do not only concern Africa, but French foreign policy in general (Ministère de la Défense, 1994, 26, 2008, p. 97, 2013, p. 51-52). Security problems in Africa are seen as military issues in the paper of 1994. The White Paper of 2008 expresses a more liberal approach to security and development and poverty eradication are seen as security measures in 2008. The White Paper of 2013 gives a double sided picture, while suggesting economic development, it opens up more for combatting security risks with military means than that of 2008. The paper of 2013 thus shows stronger signs of realist security than that of 2008.

The results of the text analysis are summarized in Table 9 below.
Table 9: Results of the Textual Analysis

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcategory of Eurafrica</th>
<th>Characteristics of geopolitical construction</th>
<th>France acting by itself</th>
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5. Conclusion

The analysis has proven that *Eurafrica* is, as Hansen and Jonsson (2015) suggest, a complex concept. It can however be unpacked into six subcategories. These are; A.) A (neo-)colonial vision of domination of Africa; B.) Influence over Africa as a source of French status in the World; C.) Africa as a way of balancing against other actors in the global political system; D.) Africa as a strategic interest; E.) Africa as an economic interest; and G.) Africa as a way for France to promote European integration. The subcategories are based on neo-liberal, neo-realist and constructivist theoretical assumptions.

Based on the unpacked definition of the *Eurafrican* concept, there is reason to question the previous academic work that links *Eurafrica* to the Europeanization of French strategy in Africa. Their analysis of *Eurafrica* as simply a Europeanization of France’s strategy to in a neo-colonial way dominate Africa is a simplification for two reasons. Firstly, *Eurafrica* was to a large extent a colonial, and subsequently neo-colonial, project, but has shown to be based on diverse arguments, some more neo-colonial than others. Secondly, the Eurafricanists of the 1950’s saw Africa rather as a security asset than a security problem.

Since the Europeanization of armed intervention is envisaged (with increased pertinence) in all three White Papers, France is likely to have played a part in development of increased EU-coordination of security, described in the introduction. The White Papers do not portray French intervention under the leadership of another EU state as negative compared to intervention under French leadership. The neo-realist perspective that France balance’s influence against the constraints on freedom of maneuver that multilateral action as claims Charbonneau (2008), is put in doubt by the fact that the White Paper of 2008 and 2013 encourages the establishment increased EU military leadership (e.g. by the creation of a EU command center). French intervention (with or without the EU) and EU intervention are encouraged provided a security need is identified, and not seen as conflicting.

The Europeanization of French Africa policy described by scholars such as Charbonneau (2008) and Muller (2004) seems to bear less *Eurafrican* traits than they suggest. The vision of Africa as a security problem rather than a geopolitical asset dominated the in France’s geopolitical construction and whereas Africa is increasingly perceived as a strategic asset, there are no signs of France wanting to use Africa to balance against other actors. Africa is not ascribed the same centrality in the French strategy as in the *Eurafrican* geopolitical construction. Furthermore, the Europeanization strategy that France pursues in its Africa policy does not only concern Africa in but French foreign policy in general. Why this Europeanization has been more successful (at least concerning military cooperation) in Africa than in other parts of the World is a question for further study.

The non-attention to the wish of African states combined with seeing Africa as source of rank in the world suggests that the legacy of *Françafrique* has an influence on the earliest White Paper. The White Papers of 2008 and 2013 are less tied to France’s neo-colonial tradition and calls for more equal relations between Africa and France, suggesting the rupture with *Françafrique* that French policy makers have called for is reflected in French geopolitical strategy. The constructivist traits of French Africa strategy have diminished as Africa has moved beyond being a mirror in which France’s *grandeur* is reflected in 1994 to being seen as a security threat, but also a geopolitical opportunity in the 21st century. References to neo-liberal security are more prevalent in the White Paper of 2008 than in that of 2013 which has a more
neo-realist approach to security. Determining to what extent French this break with neocolonialism is reflected in practice, and how *Eurafrica* is portrayed in French civil society remain interesting areas of study.
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